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SUMMARY
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Since the failed coup attempt by parts of the Turkish military against 
President Erdogan in the summer of 2016, the Turkish government has sus-
pended more than 100,000 civil servants on the pretext that they had planned 
a coup. Out of fear of persecution and arbitrary arrests, around 21,000 Turkish 
citizens have since applied for asylum in Germany. Many of them found refuge 
in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). At the same time, communities 
of people with a migration background related to Turkey have been living in 
this federal state, particularly in the large cities, since the 1960s. This Working 
Paper examines how members of both groups in NRW perceive each other and 
how they interact with each other in everyday life, which conflicts arise, and 
how the political developments in Turkey affect these processes. The study 
shows that Turkish refugees experience solidarity and sympathy from people 
with a Turkey-related migration background and their organisations, but also 
encounter some hostility from them in everyday life. This reflects the strong 
polarisation within the communities of people with a Turkey-related migration 
background in NRW since 2016, which the Working Paper also addresses. The 
author advocates a differentiated, empirically-based approach to the subject 
area and strongly warns against generalisations. Approaches to conflict reso-
lution must incorporate the complexity of actors and interactions, as well as 
the diversity of opinions and positions within communities with a connec-
tion to Turkey. 
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preters or employees of security services in refugee 
shelters or the Federal Office for Migration and Refu-
gees (BAMF). Such experiences increase their feeling 
of insecurity and, as a result, some refugees resort to 
strategies for avoiding contact and hiding their own 
identity in everyday life which they developed in  
Turkey. This complicates their mental process of  
settlement in the new context.
These processes reflect both the strong 
polarisation within Turkey-related  
migrant communities in Germany and 
social contrasts in Turkey
The political developments in Turkey caused a 
strong polarisation within the NRW-based Turkey- 
related migrant communities, particularly between 
supporters of the Gulen movement and the Turkish 
government, but secular-oriented people and organi-
sations are affected as well. Turkish refugees experi-
ence the effects of this polarisation in everyday life. 
Therefore, they only seek contact to or receive sup-
port from organisations and individuals who are 
close to them in terms of their worldview. However, 
encounters with Turkish refugees and people with a 
Turkey-related migration background in NRW also 
display features of a social class contrast: the Turkish 
refugees often had a privileged social and economic 
position in Turkey and were accustomed to the corre-
sponding treatment, while the families of many people 
with a Turkey-related migration background immi-
grated from a less privileged geographical and social 
context. This contrast influences the mutual percep-
tion of both groups and their interaction with each 
other in the German context, in which the balance of 
power has been reversed by the effects of forced dis-
placement and migration.
Past experiences of forced displace-
ment and repression continue to shape 
the everyday lives of Turkish refugees 
in North Rhine-Westphalia.
Refugees from Turkey have usually experienced 
political repression and persecution before they had 
to flee. These experiences also determine their pro-
cess of settlement in Germany and their behaviour in 
the new living environment. Out of fear of persecution 
and negative consequences for relatives in Turkey, or 
so as not to repeat traumatic experiences, they ini-
tially avoid contact with people with a Turkey-related 
migration background and migrant organisations 
(so-called migrant self-organisations) and are very 
cautious in everyday life. However, this reinforces 
their social isolation. At first, they do not recognise 
the plurality of opinions and the polarised debates 
within the Turkey-related migrant communities in 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). At the same time, 
they remain in contact with relatives and friends and 
are emotionally involved in the developments in 
their country of origin.
In everyday life, Turkish refugees  
experience hostility from individuals 
with a Turkey-related migration back-
ground that refers to political conflicts 
in Turkey
Refugees from Turkey and people with a Turkey- 
related migration background mainly encounter each 
other in their living environment, at school, or in 
kindergarten. In some cases, the refugees experience 
hostility from supporters of the Turkish government, 
who refer to political developments in Turkey. They 
report, for example, that they are insulted as “traitors”, 
“supporters of terrorism” or “Gulenists”.1  Some refu-
gees have also had similar experiences with inter 
 
1 \  Supporters of the movement of the preacher Fethullah Gulen, who are 
held responsible by the Turkish government for the unsuccessful coup 
attempt and are classified as a terror organisation by Turkey (European 
Commission, p. 8)
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Turkey-related migrant self-organisa-
tions carry out work of social importance 
but have to accomplish a delicate  
balancing act
If the refugees overcome their initial mistrust 
through positive personal experiences, independent 
migrant self-organisations can be an important 
source of support and guidance for them. These  
organisations take a very critical view of political  
developments in Turkey, but also of the increasing 
polarisation within German society. Their representa-
tives are particularly aware of the effects of these devel-
opments in the Turkey-related communities. Some of 
them face the same accusations as the Turkish refugees. 
At the same time, they note that the German public is 
currently watching them with a particularly critical 
eye, which results in a feeling of constant pressure to 
position themselves publicly. These organisations 
and their staff, therefore, find themselves in a tricky 
position, as they have to mediate between Turkey- 
related migrant communities, refugees, and society 
as a whole, while at the same time having to moderate 
complex discussion processes among their members. 
However, the activities of these organisations fulfil 
an important function in fostering understanding 
within society as a whole. Local and state politics and 
civil society should acknowledge this and support 
them accordingly.
Scientific studies and approaches to 
conflict management must take greater 
account of the everyday experiences of 
those affected
Theoretical approaches to the study of conflicts 
within and between communities of migrants and 
refugees have so far rarely dealt with the actual 
everyday experiences of people affected by these  
conflicts. The experiences of refugees who have only 
recently had to leave their context of origin have so 
far been completely left out of scientific considerations. 
This is a research gap that should be addressed in 
future studies. The complex everyday experiences of 
refugees and their day-to-day interaction processes 
enable a new conceptual approach to conflicts within 
the migration society. The empirical findings derived 
must be taken into account by initiatives and projects 
for conflict management, so as to not neglect any 
relevant aspects. Although the conflicts observed in 
this study usually remain latent and do not turn  
violent, there is certainly a risk of escalation, which 
must be prevented. People who have fled violence and 
persecution must feel safe in Germany. 
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Since the failed military coup in Turkey on 15/16 
June 2016, around 21,000 Turkish citizens have applied 
for asylum in Germany. In 2019, they were the fourth- 
largest group among all applicants (BAMF, 2018, 2019, 
p. 3). In 2017 alone, around 2,500 Turkish citizens  
applied for asylum in North Rhine-Westphalia (MKFFI 
NRW 2017, p 16). They flee persecution because of 
their political views, unlawful arrests and allegations 
of being terrorists or conspirators. There are also re-
ports of torture and undocumented detention centres 
in Turkey (European Commission, 2018, pp. 23, 32). At 
the same time, North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) has 
been home to people with a Turkey-related migration 
background since the 1960s.2  Their number is esti-
mated at around 850,000, many of whom live in the 
conurbations along the Rhine and Ruhr rivers (MKFFI 
NRW, 2017, p 12). This is also where the organisational 
centres of Turkey-related community life in Germany 
are located (Schührer, 2018, p 13). Some commentators 
feared that under these circumstances, the conflicts 
in Turkey could also spread to Germany and warned 
that the arrival of a large number of refugees in com-
bination with an allegedly partially failed integration 
policy carried the danger of “importing” violent con-
flicts (Poschardt, 2014; Decker, 2016).
The term “conflict importation” suggests that the 
feared conflicts are a one-way street: Refugees3  and 
other migrants bring their conflicts into the settle-
ment society,4  which has no part in their emergence. 
However, international research shows that the con-
ditions under which migrants live in the country of 
settlement determine the emergence of such con-
flicts just as strongly as influences from the country of  
origin (Monahan, Berns-McGown & Morden, 2014). 
2 \  In this Paper, people with a Turkey-related migration background  
are defined as all persons with at least one family member who mi-
grated from Turkey to the Federal Republic of Germany. The term 
“Turkey-related” is chosen as a working term, because the population  
of Turkey consists of numerous groups that differ in terms of their 
religious self-image, their cultural affiliation, their language or their 
migration background. This acknowledges the sometimes controversial 
debates in the German context on terminology when referring to  
migrants and their second- and third generation descendants, which 
is closely related to the issue of citizenship (see Yildirim, 2018, p. 14).
3 \  The term “refugee” is used in this Working Paper when it refers to  
people who have applied for asylum in Germany and to people who 
refer to themselves as refugees.
4 \  This study uses the term “settlement society” to emphasise that migrants 
and refugees settle permanently at the destination to build up a life there 
and become part of the local living environment (see Luft, 2011, p. 12).
Introduction
Furthermore, migrant communities and migrant 
self-organisations (MSOs)5  can intensify nationalist, 
ethnic or religious self-perceptions of their members 
with their activities and use violence suffered or re-
membered collectively as a resource for mobilisation. 
As people who have experienced processes of forced 
displacement and migration are already reorienting 
themselves and, as a result, often experience a change 
of their personal identity, they are susceptible to this 
type of discourse. In such cases, a strong identification 
with nationalistic, ethnic or religious group identities 
is an individual consequence of the migration process. 
Socio-economic exclusion and cultural marginalisa-
tion in the country of settlement reinforce these 
developments. 
However, MSOs also offer refugees and migrants 
an important reference point in the new society. They 
serve as mediators between established and newly  
arrived population groups and may, under certain  
circumstances, make it possible to live out identities 
and opinions that are suppressed in the context of  
origin. Instead of a one-sided view, which interprets 
conflicts between and within migrant communities 
solely as a continuation of the constellations in the 
countries of origin of those affected, a conflict analysis 
is needed that comprehensively considers the mutual 
relationship between different migrant groups, the 
settlement society and the context of origin. Ap-
proaches to conflict management or transformation 
must be based on such an analysis. 
These considerations present an opportunity for 
the study at hand to examine the interaction processes 
and conflicts between Turkish refugees and people 
with a Turkey-related migration background in NRW. 
The central question is: What conflicts do Turkish  
refugees experience in everyday life, to which political 
developments in Turkey do those involved refer, and 
what conclusions for scientific discussions can be 
drawn from this analysis? 
5 \  “Migrant self-organisations” are defined here as “associations [...](1) 
whose objectives and purposes arise as a result of the situation and 
interests of people with migrant backgrounds, (2) whose members are 
mostly people with a migration background and (3) in which people 
with a migration background play a significant role in their internal 
structures and processes” (Pries, 2013, own translation). Some of the 
actors interviewed for this study reject this term for themselves.  
However, as it is generally easy to understand, the term is still used 
here as a working term.
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noted re-ethnicisation processes and an increasing 
attraction of nationalist and Islamist ideologies  
especially among young people with a Turkey-related 
migration background born in Germany. 
Although the authors identified a lack of recogni-
tion and socio-economic inclusion of migrants  
in German society as the decisive factors for this  
development, they also pointed to the persistence of 
traditional, patriarchal patterns of parenting and role 
models within the Turkey-related communities, which 
also played a role in this development (Heitmeyer, 
1996; Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 1997; Heitmeyer, Müller 
& Schröder, 1998).
Some of the cited authors put forward the thesis 
that it was the developments in the countries of origin 
in particular that were triggering this re-ethnicisation, 
and that recourse to ethnic group identity filled an 
“identity vacuum” created by migration. They stated 
that this “conflict importation” had complicated the 
integration into the German majority society of the 
migrants concerned (Heitmeyer, 1996, Skubsch, 2000, 
pp. 49-51). They concluded that the German state 
must support the assimilation of the affected migrant 
groups into society through educational offers and 
pedagogy. According to the study, in the process the 
state should work towards the adoption of the lan-
guage, values and way of life of the majority society 
while the segregation of migrants, who were only in-
tegrated into their own community, should be broken 
up (Esser, 1996, 2001, pp. 17-20).
The studies cited are exemplary for the thesis of 
conflict import, as they assume that migrants who 
live ethnically isolated from the majority society  
reproduce conflicts from their home countries in the 
settlement context. However, they did not consider 
the consequences of discrimination and denied par-
ticipation migrants experience in Germany. There 
was therefore extensive criticism of this view, which 
noted in particular that the authors had largely ig-
nored the influence of the settlement society on the 
development of migrant identities and the emer-
gence of conflicts. They had also either ignored the 
transnational relationships of migrants or regarded 
them as an obstacle to integration (see Christ, 2019, 
In the last twenty years, the scientific perspectives 
on the issue of conflict importation have changed 
considerably, analogous to the transnational turna-
round in migration research (Mahler, 1998; Faist, 1998). 
While science initially regarded conflicts among  
refugees and migrants as a continuation of conflicts 
that prevail in the countries of origin of those in-
volved (so-called core conflicts), current studies include 
factors such as experiences of discrimination and  
socio-economic inequality in the receiving country 
as well as identity changes in the course of migration. 
So far, however, there has been little insight from  
research into conflicts in which refugees are involved.
Research interest in conflicts among migrants 
emerged in Germany in the 1990s. The reasons for 
this were the wars in former Yugoslavia and the esca-
lation of the conflict between the Kurdish Workers‘ 
Party PKK and the Turkish state. Both conflicts trig-
gered violent protests and confrontations between 
supporters of different conflict parties in several  
German cities (Hanrath, 2012, p. 24). The subsequent 
studies concluded that the core conflicts had an eth-
nicising effect on the people living in Germany with 
a migration background from the respective countries. 
Ethnicising means that in the course of the conflict, 
people from these countries identified more strongly 
with an ethnic group than was previously the case. 
This connection was particularly strong among  
second-generation migrants, even among those who 
did not initially attach great importance to their ethnic 
identity (Brieden & Ronge, 1995, pp. 285-286; Brieden, 
1996b). However, many participants in the research 
also explained at the time that in their everyday lives 
they saw a direct connection between the develop-
ment of the core conflicts and increasing discrimina-
tion in Germany. This supposed reduction of their 
own identity to the role of a troublemaker was stated 
by many study participants as the main reason why 
they found it difficult to identify with Germany and 
became aware of their ethnic identity (Brieden, 1996a, 
p 44). Several studies that were carried out at the 
same time at the Institute for Interdisciplinary  
Research on Conflict and Violence in Bielefeld,  
Germany, showed similar results. These studies also 
Conflict importation, conflict transportation and 
transnationalism: Conceptual background
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often trigger a reorientation of both individual and 
collective self-perceptions of migrants (Riemann, 
2003). In this context, Feron (2016) speaks of “identity 
insecurity” (p. 365). This reorientation can refer to 
one‘s own biography and origin or to that of the fam-
ily, and can reactivate ethnic, national or even reli-
gious affiliations that refer to the context of origin. In 
this context, it is conceivable that a return to conflict 
lines from the context of origin may occur. The more 
precarious life in the reception context, the more 
likely an import of these conflict lines, as social and 
economic inequality, discrimination and racism  
reinforce this process. Studies show that this mainly 
affects second- and third-generation migrants who 
have already grown up in the settlement context 
(Hanrath, 2012, p. 25; Yildirim, 2018, pp. 240-243). The 
original reasons for migration also influence the  
positioning of migrant communities with regard to 
the core conflict. Thus, collectively experienced or  
remembered forced displacement, violence and trauma 
often form a central reference point for the self-per-
ception of migrant communities that were forced to 
leave their context of origin. These memories are 
passed on through family narratives and thus become 
part of the collective memory (Koinova, 2016, p. 322). 
Narratives and memories referring to “places of long-
ing” (Bromber, 2013, p. 65) in the context of origin are 
also taken up and (re-)interpreted in the respective 
settlement context (Freitag & Oppen, 2005, pp. 2-3).  
Organised diaspora communities6  and migrant  
 
 
6 \  This study follows the definition of Safran (1991) who defines diaspora 
as “expatriate minority communities whose members share several of 
the following characteristics: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been 
dispersed from a specific original “center” to two or more “peripheral”, 
or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth 
about their original homeland— its physical location, history, and 
achievements; 3) they believe that they are not— and perhaps cannot 
be— fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alien-
ated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as 
their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descend-
ants would (or should) eventually return— when conditions are appro-
priate; 5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to 
the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its 
safety and prosperity; and 6) they continue to relate, personally or  
vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-
communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by 
the existence of such a relationship. (Safran 1991, pp. 83-84) Here, it is 
the collective memory of and the continuing relationship to the coun-
try of origin that are decisive
pp. 15-17). The thesis of conflict importation, which 
only considers influencing factors from the context 
of origin of migrants, has therefore been refuted from 
a scientific point of view. However, it remains a power-
ful view in German politics and with the public, as is 
shown by the media reports cited at the beginning of 
this Paper.
From “conflict importation” to “conflict 
transportation”: The interrelationship 
between core conflicts and the condi-
tions of the receiving society
With the shift towards transnationalism (Etzold, 
2017, p. 45) in migration research, several studies have 
rejected the thesis of “conflict importation” (see, for 
example, Baser, 2015, p 106). Since then, researchers 
speak of “conflict transportation” (Feron, 2017). This 
term evolved from a critical reading of the “methodo-
logical nationalism” of contemporary migration  
research, which found that the social relationships 
and personal experiences of migrants not only have 
the place of settlement as a reference but are situated 
in a transnational context (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 
2002). 
Instead, proponents of the hypothesis of conflict 
transportation focus on the cross-border social rela-
tions of migrants and their simultaneous positioning 
in different contexts (Faist, 1998; Wimmer & Glick 
Schiller, 2002). They also take into account individual 
experiences in the migration process, which play an 
important role in the development of migrant identi-
ties and social relationships (Mahler, 1998, pp. 66-73; 
Glick Schiller, Caglar & Guldbrandsen, 2006). This  
approach acknowledges that core conflicts transferred 
through transnational relationships affect the social 
relations of migrants in the context of the receiving 
country. At the same time, however, it assumes that 
the conditions of the host society and the conse-
quences of the migration process determine the way 
such conflicts are dealt with (Baser, 2015, pp. 7-8; Faist, 
1998; Feron, 2016). Disorientation and uncertainty as a 
result of changes in the social and cultural context as 
well as the loss of status in the course of migration 
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self-organisations play an important role in these 
processes. While most organisations primarily focus 
on maintaining tradition and integrating into the 
settlement society, some explicitly pursue political 
goals. Some of them are in close contact with actors 
from the context of origin who try to influence dias-
pora communities specifically for their own means 
(Feron & Lefort, 2018, pp. 43-44). These organisations 
usually paint a romanticised image of the “old home-
land” and promote nationalism related to the country 
of origin (Baser, 2015, p. 17; Feron, 2012). In the process, 
the lines of a core conflict can be utilised to ensure 
cohesion and identity of their own group in a foreign 
country and possibly promote the reproduction of 
core conflicts in exile (Faist, 1998, pp. 235-242; Feron, 
2012). 
Diaspora communities that developed from con-
flict-induced migration thus differ from those whose 
members migrated primarily for economic reasons; 
however nationalism related to the country of origin 
can also re-emerge in the case of the latter. Due to 
their degree of organisation, their resources and their 
visibility in the public, such organisations often shape 
the way entire migrant communities from a certain 
context of origin are perceived by the host society. In 
addition, they often claim a representative role for 
these communities. This position is sometimes even 
officially conceded to them by the policy of the settle-
ment country, as they grant them a sort of monopoly 
status as contact partners for integration policy.  
However, this does not do justice to the actual diversity 
of migration-related experiences and discourses.  
On the contrary, there are usually intense disputes 
between various organisations and associations 
about the question of who may legitimately represent 
the community. These disputes are often barely per-
ceived by the majority society. Generalisations based 
on the activities of individual organisations or indi-
viduals must therefore be avoided (Adamson, 2005; 
Koinova, 2017, p 7; Feron & Lefort, 2018). The following 
discussions take this into account. 
Besides concrete and tangible, current “conflict 
events” in the context of origin, discrimination in 
the settlement context, collectively experienced or 
remembered suffering, and the activities of diaspora 
organisations thus also lead to the reproduction of 
political, ethnic or religious affiliations and lines of 
conflict in the diaspora, although there are often no 
longer any personal or geographical points of contact 
with them (Feron, 2016, pp. 368-370; Hanrath, 2011, p 6). 
In the course of particularly conflict-laden events in 
the context of origin of those involved, these conflicts 
might erupt in the settlement context. Nevertheless, 
these are not a mere continuation of conflicts from 
the context of origin. Instead, they are also an expres-
sion of experiences of conflict in the settlement  
society such as discrimination, ethnic segregation, or 
lack of participation. However, these experiences are 
articulated in the categories and the language of the 
core conflict and are in part influenced by actors 
from the homeland context. Such conflicts can thus 
be seen as a process of identity formation in the con-
text of a migration society. Often,the categories, the 
language and the lines of a core conflict are used in 
this context. This is what Feron (2016), for instance, 
calls conflict transportation. 
German-language migration research has so far 
dealt only marginally with this topic. In the few 
exceptions, the Turkish–Kurdish conflict is usually 
the focus of attention, while other conflicts remain 
underexposed (Baser, 2015; Hanrath, 2011, p. 9). German- 
speaking and international researchers so far have 
not investigated conflicts among refugees and their 
interactions with migrant communities with roots 
in the same countries of origin (Krause, 2018, pp. 13, 
26). Scientific studies concerning the involvement of 
migrant self-organisations in refugee work (Karakayali, 
2018, pp. 19-21) are just as few and far between. The 
findings of this Study cast doubt on whether the  
thesis of conflict transportation is transferable to the 
group of refugees. Primarily, refugees differ from 
migrants and their descendants through what is (for 
the time being) a short stay in the receiving country. 
Furthermore, in contrast to migrant communities 
who have migrated primarily out of economic cons-
traints, they have had drastic, sometimes violent 
experiences in the core conflicts and while fleeing. 
Researchers should take this into account accor-
dingly. This Study presents some ideas on how to close 
these research gaps. 
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This Working Paper and its underlying research 
are part of the project “Between civil war and inte-
gration—Refugees and the challenges and opportuni-
ties of societal change in NRW”, which BICC has been 
carrying out since April 2016 and is funded by the 
Ministry of Culture and Science of North Rhine-West-
phalia. Since September 2018, the author has inter-
viewed 32 refugees from Turkey as part of three group 
interviews and numerous individual interviews. He 
interviewed several of them more than once, taking 
the opportunity to also discuss the changes that had 
occurred during this period. The author also spoke 
with representatives of several migrant self-organisa-
tions, advisory centres and research institutions, as 
well as social workers.
The interviews with refugees focused on three  
areas: (1) their experiences after their arrival in  
Germany and the impact of the experience of displace-
ment on their self-perception; (2) experiences with 
other refugees, migrant communities and migrant 
self-organisations in the place of settlement and the 
perceived influence of political developments in  
Turkey on these processes; (3) the attitudes of the  
interviewees towards members of the respective other 
groups. These conversations were based on the model 
of the narrative interview, in which the interviewer‘s 
input is limited to a few open questions (Riemann, 
2003; Rosenthal, 2016). The content of the conversa-
tion rested upon the interviewees. For the interviews 
with representatives of migrant self-organisations 
and advisory centres, the author had developed ques-
tion guides in advance (Bernard, 2006, pp. 210-251; 
Kruse, 2015, pp. 166-167). Here, the thematic focus was 
on the activities of the organisation in question in its 
work with Turkish refugees and on the effects of the 
conflicts in Turkey on the respective organisation or 
the respective interview partners. 
A challenge for the research was the situation  
of the refugees, who often have an uncertain legal 
status and have partly been through traumatic expe-
riences before and while they fled their homes. To 
prepare for such situations, the researchers of the 
abovementioned project first took part in trauma- 
awareness training to avoid unintentionally stressful 
interview situations for the interviewees. Accordingly, 
the interviews did not address any potentially trau-
matic experiences. Many of the interviewees never- 
theless used the conversations to talk about stories of 
and reasons for their displacement (Rosenthal, 2016,  
pp. 924-927). 
Furthermore, the author tried to control the effects 
of power asymmetry with regard to the interviewees 
as much as possible by constantly assuring confidenti-
ality and transparency, leaving it to the interviewees 
to choose the time and place of the conversations and 
to co-determine the content (Miko-Schefzig & Reiter, 
2018; Rosenthal, 2016, p. 928). Furthermore, they were 
free to stop the conversation at any time, but this did 
not happen.7 
A limitation for this study results from the fact 
that it has not yet been possible to have longer conver-
sations with female refugees, as it was mostly men 
who reacted to being contacted, and they did not bring 
their wives along to the conversations. This seems all 
the more relevant, as several interview partners pointed 
out that their wives and children were suffering more 
from the experiences of having fled their homes and 
the sudden change of their place of residence than 
they were themselves. Thus, the statements presented 
here largely reflect the positions of male refugees.
7 \  A Turkish social scientist, who himself had to flee Turkey in the after-
math of the coup attempt, also helped to establish contacts and select 
confidential interview locations in public areas. He was also present at 
many conversations, asking questions and interpreting. This way, trust 
was quickly built up, and the language barrier was reduced. For this, I am 
very grateful to him. This approach is based on the idea of cooperative 
research, which actively involves the research participants in shaping 
the research project (Fontanari, Karpenstein, Schwarz & Sulimma, 2014).
The methodology of the study
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An inductive approach to data analysis, based on 
the Grounded Theory method, was chosen for this 
study. Accordingly, this analysis is divided into four 
sub-chapters based on the categories encountered 
during data analysis: (1) the experiences of Turkish 
refugees before and after having fled and the effects 
of these experiences on their self-perception; (2) the 
interactions between refugees and people with a  
Turkey-related migration background in the place of 
settlement and the conflicts experienced; (3) the mu-
tual perception of the individual groups, as well as (4) 
the experiences of Turkey-related migrant self-organ-
isations and the developments within Turkey-related 
migrant communities against the background of the 
conflicts in Turkey. Sub-chapters (1) and (3) analyse 
statements on the socio-economic causes of conflicts, 
while (2) and (4) describe the phenomenology of the 
conflicts. The analysis approaches influences from 
the context of origin and settlement reciprocally and 
not in individual separate sub-chapters, as the partic-
ipants in the conversations did not make this distinc-
tion in their answers either. The Turkish refugees are 
very aware of events occurring in Turkey, and this has 
a strong influence on their behaviour in the settle-
ment context, which is why the interview partners 
addressed them again and again. This underlines the 
transnational positioning of those interviewed and 
the transnational character of the conflicts identified 
in this research.
“I have disappeared”: Fleeing from  
Turkey and the settlement process in 
Germany
At first, the conversations with refugees focused 
on the consequences of political repression in Turkey 
and the experiences while they were fleeing. Their  
reports illustrate the profound impact that political 
repression has on the biographies of those who are 
subjected to it. Most interview partners held prestig-
ious social and professional positions in Turkey. 
Among them are public prosecutors, police officers 
and university lecturers who were accustomed to 
corresponding social interaction. Most were dis-
missed from their old employment on the basis of,  
according to their own accounts, false suspicions of 
being supporters of terrorism, or Gulen supporters8  
and coup-plotters. They also feel strongly that their 
dismissal, often from national service, and the subse-
quent persecution is a devaluation of their life 
achievements (GI1, GI2, GI3).9  
After losing their jobs and subsequently being 
persecuted by the state, some of them hid in anony-
mously rented apartments or hotel rooms, some-
times for several weeks. They tried to avoid their 
neighbours so as not to attract attention. Some  
reported that they only dared to venture out onto the 
streets in the dark and that they could not go shop-
ping (I4, I7, I8, GI12, GI13). One interviewee described 
this tactic with the words “I have disappeared” (GI3). 
Often, however, their children made permanent hid-
ing in Turkey impossible. For instance, neighbours 
became suspicious of one of the families concerned, 
because their children did not go to school. The chil-
dren were bored at home, played loudly and thus 
drew attention to the apartment. In many cases, like 
in this one, concern for the safety of the family finally 
made them take the decision to flee from Turkey. (I1, 
I8, I9, GI2, GI3). 
One interview partner reported that he had been 
arrested although innocent after the military coup 
and had been charged with being a terrorist due to 
the forced statement of a friend. After returning from 
several months in custody, none of his 16 neighbours 
in the house approached him to inquire about his sit 
 
8 \  The Gulen Movement is a network for religious and educational policy, 
which, according to its own statements, “[maintains] more than 1,500 
schools in more than 160 countries, [organises] private tutoring courses, 
[runs] “dialogue institutes”, publishes newspapers and magazines, 
[owns] television stations, and [is] connected via globally active busi-
ness associations. The movement that likes to call [itself] Hizmet (ser-
vice to others) arose in Turkey. [...] In Germany, more than 300 regional 
educational associations are active, which, according to their own  
information, run schools, mostly secondary schools [Gymnasien], and 
cultivate “intercultural dialogue” (Seufert, 2014; Dohrn, 2017). Turkey 
classifies the Gulen movement as a terrorist organisation, but the  
European Commission does not (European Commission, 2018, p. 8). Some 
analystss accuse the network of being a parapolitical organisation 
aimed at fostering power and influence (Watmough & Ozturk, 2018). 
9 \  As the interview partners did not want to have the conversations  
recorded due to security concerns, their statements are usually para-
phrased here.
Conflict analysis
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withholding information concerning the asylum 
procedure (GI1, GI2, I1, I9). Due to these experiences, 
some try to reduce contact with the authorities to a 
minimum and do not take advantage of advisory  
services either (I8, I9). This shows that the immobility, 
which is experienced by many of those affected as be-
ing imposed by the circumstances, has a considerable 
effect on their self-perception and the possibility of 
establishing social contacts in the place of settlement. 
These experiences trigger resignation and social iso-
lation and convey to the refugees the feeling that 
they are not needed in Germany. As a result, the old 
identity, which was strongly influenced by their  
profession and the associated social status, loses im-
portance for the interview partners. For example, one 
interviewee said that he now neither felt like a Turk 
nor a German, but that he wanted to be a global citizen 
instead. He also said that he had to explain to his 
family that “nothing will ever be the same again” (I1). 
These statements are significant against the back-
ground of the thesis of conflict transportation,  
according to which violence and traumatisation suf-
fered during forced migration, in combination with 
uncertainties in the reorientation of one‘s own iden-
tity, foster the emergence of conflicts.
However, Turkey still remains an important refer-
ence point for the refugees. All interview partners 
keep in touch with relatives and friends via telephone 
calls, Facebook and various messenger services, and 
thus also take part in the political and social develop-
ment of the country. In the process, they also obtain 
information about their relatives’ personal circum-
stances. Several interviewees spoke, for example, of 
acquaintances or relatives who are still in prison 
for political reasons (I1, I7, I8). Some had even lost  
acquaintances through suicide as a result of the waves 
of dismissals and arrests following the attempted 
coup, or reported that friends had been tortured in 
prison (I8, GI2, GI3). As politically active people, they 
also take great interest in these developments and 
are emotionally involved despite living in Germany. 
uation. This disturbed him greatly, and he said that 
because of how he was treated, he was almost 
convinced himself that he was guilty of a crime. Due 
to these experiences, he avoids contact with the 
Turkish community in Germany as he expects no  
understanding from the people there, and a rational 
discussion is generally not possible. The prospect of 
getting back into a situation similar to that in Turkey 
seems so painful to him that he wants to avoid a new 
confrontation at all costs. In his opinion, the conse-
quences of such an experience cannot be compre-
hended by people who have not experienced it them-
selves (GI2).
After fleeing, the refugees experience a dramatic 
loss of status due to living in shared accommodation 
facilities or small apartments, as well as their precarious 
status as refugees or asylum seekers. The experience 
of being dependent on transfer payments and the  
decisions of the Federal Office for Migration and Refu-
gees (BAMF) is also very painful. This hits them even 
harder, as almost all of them had a high social status 
in their homeland and were accustomed to “taking 
care of their own affairs” (I6). This and the low proba-
bility, especially for former civil servants, of being able 
to work in their old profession again in Germany led 
to a high degree of resignation. Several interview part-
ners mentioned that they felt they were not needed in 
Germany. A former public prosecutor said that he felt 
“like a foreign body that needs to be repelled” 10 (I8). 
Another interview partner does not want to return to 
Turkey, as he cannot live there under the current con-
ditions and does not expect any understanding from 
Turkish society. At the same time, he is certain that in 
Germany, he “will never get back his customary social 
status again” (GI2). 
The conversations also show that many refugees 
had devastating experiences at the BAMF and the job 
centres. They complain that the German authorities 
do not address their individual circumstances, poten-
tial and needs, but instead make their life more diffi-
cult with restrictions and long waiting times, and by 
 
 
 
10 \  The cited passages are literal quotations of the interview partners, 
which were translated into English.
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One interviewee put it this way: He could not disas-
sociate himself from the events in Turkey any more 
than he could be separated from a limb (I8). Another 
said that the events in Turkey naturally continued to 
affect them, the refugees from Turkey, even in Germany: 
“How could they not?” (GI2). However, some interview-
ees severely restrict contact with their relatives who 
have remained in their home country for fear of  
negative consequences for them. They find this very 
painful, as it further intensifies their social isolation 
in Germany (I7, GI2). But because of their isolation 
and lack of language skills, it is difficult for many  
refugees to make contact with the majority society: 
One interviewee felt that he was “not in Germany at 
the moment” (GI2) due to the remote location of his 
accommodation facility and the high proportion of 
migrants among the employees. Like most of the in-
terview partners, he would like to have more in-depth 
contact “with Germans” (GI2). A major obstacle to  
integration is the fact that due to a feeling of mistrust, 
those affected often initially reject counselling or 
support from migrant self-organisations, but are often 
unaware of other services—or are unable to reach 
them. The reasons for this are illustrated in the 
following section.
These statements partly confirm the assumption 
of the conflict transportation hypothesis that the  
circumstances of forced displacement and the expe-
riences in the reception context, together with trans-
national information exchange, strongly influence 
migrants’ identity development. However, they con-
tradict the thesis with regard to one important point: 
The interviewees in the context of this study did not 
experience the re-ethnicisation process assumed by 
the theory. On the contrary, the old Turkish ethnic or 
civic identity lost importance for them. Accordingly, 
they did not mention any conflicts related to political 
developments in Turkey with other Turkish refugees. 
These conflicts did not become apparent during the 
group interviews either. Due to their shared experi-
ences, there was instead a sense of solidarity among 
the participants. This may also be due to the fact that 
all refugees come from a similar social and 
professional context and have been forced to flee for 
similar reasons. In the interviews, they reported that 
they experienced conflicts primarily in the interac-
tion with people with a Turkey-related migration 
background in the respective place of settlement. In 
the following, this will be investigated.
“We don‘t want your money”:  
Encounters and conflicts between 
Turkish refugees and people with a 
Turkey-related migration background 
in their place of settlement
In contrast to the experiences of solidarity 
among Turkish refugees, their relationship with  
people with a Turkey-related migration background 
in the German settlement context is characterised  
by mistrust and sometimes conflict. In this context, 
referring to the key question of the study, the political 
discourse in Turkey certainly influences their experi-
ences in Germany. Due to the very tense housing 
market in the large cities of North Rhine-Westphalia 
and their limited financial possibilities, Turkish refu-
gees often move into areas that are already character-
ised by a high proportion of inhabitants with a mi-
gration history, including many with a Turkey-related 
background. Not all interviewees consider this to be 
beneficial, although the Turkish-language services 
available in these neighbourhoods make it easier to 
settle there. For example, one interviewee described 
the suburb of a big city in the Ruhr area in which his 
family had been accommodated as a “very bad place” 
due to the high proportion of inhabitants with a mi-
gration history and the generally low social status of 
most inhabitants (GI3). Another is also unhappy 
about his strongly Turkish-influenced living environ-
ment in the periphery of a big city in the Rhine region, 
as the risk of encountering “other Turks” seems to 
him to be very high there (I1). In these assessments, 
the possibility of meeting supporters of the Turkish 
government in the neighbourhood and thus evoking 
conflicts plays an important role. However, due to the 
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common practice within the Turkey-related commu-
nities to ask for the origin, personal background or 
political attitude of the conversation partners, the 
consequence being a constant compulsion to position 
oneself in everyday life (I10, I11, I12). For these reasons, 
the refugees have the impression that they are under 
observation and possibly under threat. 
The accompanying fear in this process is not un-
founded. For example, one interview partner reported 
an incident at a Turkish market in his current place 
of residence in NRW: An older trader, who had noticed 
that he and his family did not understand German, 
asked him about his personal background. When he 
told the truth, the trader accused him of being a Gulen 
supporter, replying: “We don‘t need your money!” 
making him and his family leave the market. (GI2). 
Several interview partners reported that being treated 
with hostility as “traitors to their fatherland” or 
“terrorist supporters” by individuals with a Turkey- 
related migration background is rather common in 
everyday life, with the result that they avoid contact 
as much as possible (I5, I9, GI2). However, this also 
means that they are prevented from connecting with 
Turkey-related communities and associations. This 
applies especially to those refugees who do not sym-
pathise with the Gulen movement and therefore do 
not want to turn to its networks in NRW. The combi-
nation of the general difficulties for refugees to con-
nect to German society and the sometimes isolated 
location of their places of residence, puts them in a 
precarious social situation.
Furthermore, the experiences of Turkish refugees 
during the hearings at the BAMF influence their atti-
tudes towards people with a Turkey-related migrant 
background. Some interview partners reported prob-
lems with the interpreters during the hearings. They 
claimed that their translation was deliberately wrong 
and speculated that the interpreters in question were 
supporters of the Turkish government who did not 
want Turkish opposition members to find refuge in 
Germany (I1, I7, I8, I9). Reports about “Turkish spies 
at the BAMF” (Karakoyun, 2018, p. 24), as can be found, 
for example, in a leaflet of the Gulen movement, create 
a high degree of uncertainty among the refugees.
proximity, encounters between the two groups occur 
automatically in everyday life, for example when 
shopping, at school or in kindergarten. 
In the schools, classmates and parents with a 
Turkey-related migration background soon notice 
that the children of the refugees do not speak German. 
According to some interviewees, the pronunciation of 
the Turkish language also distinguishes those who 
have recently arrived from the people living here 
with a Turkey-related migration background (I1, I13). 
One interview partner who still goes to school said 
that classmates with a Turkey-related migration 
background rejected him due to his poor German  
language skills (I2). His classmates also noticed the 
lack of language skills of his parents, which led them 
and their parents to conclude that the family must 
have come to Germany only recently. Other interview 
partners reported similar experiences (I1, I9). 
Several interview partners said that in this context, 
people with a Turkey-related migration background 
often asked them about their residence status and 
the reason for their being in Germany (I9, I11, GI2). 
Some were also approached in the context of reli-
gious festivities or charitable events on the street or 
in the apartment building (I1, I4, GI2). Some people 
asking these questions probably hoped to get infor-
mation about possibilities for relatives to enter the 
country from Turkey (I1, I4). The refugees, however, 
interpreted these questions as a subtle form of inter-
rogation. In such situations, they usually avoid telling 
the truth about why they are in Germany, or they lie 
for fear of arousing hostilities: One of them claimed 
to be a guest researcher on an exchange programme 
in Germany (I9). Another said he was an Erasmus  
student from Turkey (GI3). Most refugees try to avoid 
such encounters in general. Some only speak English 
in public so as not to be recognised. Others avoid 
staying in places with a strong presence of Turkey- 
related people or organisations (I1, I4, I9, GI2). However, 
none of the interviewees had any illusions about being 
able to conceal the truth for a long time, as they are 
often asked about their residence status and their 
history (I4, I4). This was also confirmed by employees 
of information centres, according to whom it was 
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moved out of the shared accommodation facilities. 
According to their statements, fear for the safety of 
relatives and friends in Turkey plays an important 
role (I4, I7). 
The interviews showed that such experiences 
prevented the interviewees from overcoming the fear 
of state persecution that they brought with them 
from Turkey. For example, a couple that was inter-
viewed who had lost their jobs as a result of the failed 
military coup reported that shortly after their arrival 
in Germany they were constantly afraid of encoun-
tering a police car on the street. They had not yet got 
used to the fact that in Germany they no longer had 
to fear persecution by state authorities. At the same 
time, they also reported problems with interpreters 
during their hearing at the BAMF. They did not want 
to trust them unreservedly, as they could not judge 
which political spectrum they were close to. These 
interviewees also said that they did not want to be in 
contact with people with a Turkey-related migration 
background and that they spoke English in public out 
of fear of persecution (I4).
Similar statements were made by almost all of the 
Turkish refugees who were interviewed. Because they 
fled from political persecution in their homeland, 
they also show a lot of sensitivity to possible hostilities 
in the settlement context. However, the perceived 
threat no longer originates from the Turkish state,  
but from individuals and organisations of the Turkish 
diaspora.
They are especially concerned about possibly  
provoking negative consequences for relatives and 
friends in their place of origin through encounters 
with supporters of the Turkish government in Ger-
many (I4, I8, I9). For this reason, they are initially 
sceptical towards people with a Turkey-related migra-
tion background in the place of settlement and try to 
avoid interaction with them (I1, I4, I9). In this con-
text, several interviewees reported that they had the 
feeling that experiences they had had in Turkey were 
being repeated in Germany, and that the conflict 
from which they had fled would catch up with them 
again here (GI2). They substantiated these statements 
in particular by their feeling of being observed and 
potentially being threatened in everyday life. In 
They are afraid they will not get protection in 
Germany due to deliberate false translations by the 
interpreters and, in the worst case, be sent back to 
Turkey. Similar statements from applicants from other 
countries are also circulating and seem to point to a 
problem at the BAMF, at least between 2015 and 2017 
(see also Christ, Meininghaus & Röing, 2019, p. 23).  
Although these reports cannot be substantiated with 
certainty, they do explain the great distrust with 
which the refugees behave towards other people with 
a Turkey-related migration background in Germany. 
Refugees initially often do not differentiate between 
supporters and critics of the Turkish government and 
instead assume that most people with a Turkey-related 
migration background in Germany are supporters of 
the Turkish government. A differentiated perspective, 
which recognises the diverse and opposing positions 
among people with a Turkey-related migration back-
ground in Germany, is only adopted by some of them 
over time.
Some interviewees also reported that employees 
of the refugee shelters they lived in after arriving in 
Germany, as well as the security services staff with a 
Turkey-related migration background working there, 
were very reserved towards them. It was added that 
they did not support the Turkish refugees, while it 
was a matter of course between employees and refu-
gees with an Arabic-speaking background. In this 
case, too, they assumed that political reservations 
were the reason for this behaviour (I8, GI2, GI3, for 
other explanatory approaches see also Christ, Mein-
inghaus & Röing, 2019, pp. 34-36). One refugee said 
that in the shared accommodation facility he was 
staying at with his family, security guards with a  
Turkey-related migration background took photos of 
Turkish refugees, which, in his opinion, would be 
sent to government agencies in Turkey (I1). In this 
context, representatives of several migrant self- 
organisations reported of an “espionage hotline”  
offered by the government-affiliated Turkish news- 
paper Sabah to report “traitors” abroad (I5, I10, I11, 
Karakoyun, 2018, p. 21). These experiences create a 
high degree of insecurity, which accompanies the  
refugees far into their everyday lives, even after their 
asylum status has been recognised and they have 
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In accordance with the theory, it can be assumed 
that some members of these communities transport 
conflict lines and discourses from the Turkish context 
of origin to NRW. They also perceive the refugees from 
Turkey in the categories of these conflicts. In the case 
of the latter, it reinforces the impression that the 
conflicts in their homeland from which they have 
fled are now catching up with them again. To set the 
causes of these developments in the wider context, 
the interviewees were asked to give the reasons that, 
in their opinion, led to the conflicts described in this 
section.
“They were used to having all their  
wishes fulfilled”: The mutual perception 
of Turkish refugees and people with a 
Turkey-related migration background
This chapter analyses how the interviewees 
themselfes made sense of these conflicts. In their 
answers, many interviewees revealed their opinions 
about members of the other groups. These include 
statements by followers of the Gulen movement 
about supporters of the Turkish government, as well 
as the general perception by people with a Turkey-re-
lated migration background in Germany of refugees 
newly arriving from Turkey. These statements reflect 
the perspectives of the respective interviewees and 
allow conclusions to be drawn about the motivations 
behind their actions and their experiences described 
in the previous chapters. Furthermore, they help to 
fill the gap arising from the lack of interviews with 
supporters of the Turkish government (Hüttermann. 
2018, pp. 13-14). 
In response to the interview question as to 
whether they could understand why some people 
with a Turkey-related migration background were so 
hostile towards them, most of the refugees mentioned 
the origin of Turkish migrants in Germany (I1, I4, I9). 
In the interviews, they often emphasised that the 
generation of guest workers came from conservative, 
rural regions of Turkey where there was no high 
standard of education. They explained that in Turkey, 
response, some of them adopt security practices, 
which they had already adopted in Turkey (von  
Boemcken, Boboyorov & Bagdasarova, 2018). As ex-
plained above, this includes, for example, pretending 
in public not to speak Turkish, or avoiding certain 
places in daily life. 
Although the conflicts described remained on a 
verbal, non-violent level in all reported cases, they left 
a strong impression on those affected due to their 
powerlessness and fear of state persecution. They 
only contact people with a Turkey-related migration 
background in Germany if they can be sure that they 
are not supporters of the Turkish government. Some 
interviewees avoid even ideologically neutral and  
politically independent information centres that  
employ Turkish-speaking staff (I9). Refugees feel that 
the everyday conflicts mentioned, but also the experi-
ences described with the staff of refugee shelters as 
well as interpreters, confirm their bias and thus apply 
these to all people with a Turkey-related migration 
background. Initially, they usually do not realise that 
Turkey‘s political development and the relationship 
to the Turkish government are viewed very critically 
and discussed controversially within the Turkey- 
related communities in NRW, too. Instead, they gen-
erally assume that the majority of the German popu-
lation with a Turkey-related migration background 
supports the Turkish government. In some case, this 
goes so far that they do not contact their own family 
members who have been living in Germany for dec-
ades, for fear that they might be supporters of Erdogan 
(GI3). However, some interviewees changed their 
minds after some time, after having had good personal 
experiences with volunteers with a Turkey-related 
migration background or with migrant self-organisa-
tions (I7, I8). 
The fact that individuals explicitly refer to the  
political situation in Turkey or fall back on categories 
or manners of speaking from this context—such as 
the insults “traitor”, “Gulenist” or the accusation of 
supporting terrorism—supports the assumption that 
conflicts in Turkey cause a high degree of polarisation 
among Turkey-related communities in NRW. 
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Germany, combined with the conservative religious 
origins of many families, explained the conflicts 
within the communities. This created fertile ground 
for nationalist and fundamentalist messages from 
the country of origin (I3, I5, I6, I11, I13). According to 
the interviewees, the Turkish–Islamic Union for Reli-
gious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birligi, DITIB) 
and the Turkish media—which is popular among 
some people with a Turkey-related migration back-
ground and to a large extent now has close ties to  
the Turkish government—are prime examples of this 
influence (I11, I12, I13). 
These tensions became particularly apparent 
during the state visit of Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan to Germany in September 2018. A  
refugee said that he wanted to avoid the city centre on 
that day (I1). One interviewee with a Turkey-related 
migration background said that in the weeks leading 
up to the state visit, he had observed a lot of activity 
of Turkish government supporters on social media, 
where they called for travelling there together from 
Germany and its neighbouring countries. He was very 
concerned about this, as he feared that there would 
be riots. He believed that such activities would drive 
a wedge into the Turkish community in Germany as 
well as between people with a Turkey-related migra-
tion background and the rest of German society. He 
wished for clear statements from German policy-
makers directed towards the Turkish government 
and its influence in Germany (I6). These two inter-
viewees are sceptical about the activities of the state-
run Turkish religious authority, Diyanet, and of DITIB 
and justify this with their concern about possible 
interference from Turkey. They accuse these actors  
of using their stance and their actions to foster polar-
isation within Turkey-related migrant communities 
and to isolate some of their members (I1, I5, I6, I10, I13). 
However, some interviewees were of the opinion 
that the lines of conflict described had always been 
part of Turkish society and that they could be ex-
plained by the country‘s history. Turkish politics has 
always been organised along group affiliations and 
group identities. They said that political actors were 
this population group was economically marginalised 
and excluded from political participation for a long 
time, too. However, under the AKP government, this 
group was now in power and was allegedly trying to 
pay the injustice experienced back to the elites it  
regarded as responsible (I1, I4, I9). This process was 
now being repeated in Germany. Migrant workers 
from Turkey and their descendants had also been  
excluded and not been accepted for a long time here. 
Therefore, they had tried to keep their values and  
traditions alive in the foreign country. They still did 
not feel as if they belonged to Germany and believe 
Erdogan‘s “false promises” (I9). 
Despite this alleged consistency between develop-
ments in Turkey and in Germany claimed by the in-
terviewees, some of them also recognised differences 
between people in Turkey and people with a Turkey- 
related migration background in Germany. Thus several 
interviewees found the national-chauvinistic and 
emphatically masculine outward appearance of some 
men with a Turkey-related migration background 
perplexing, this being something they did not know 
in this form from Turkey (I1, I2, I12). Although this 
seems unlikely, these statements correspond with 
the theoretical assumption that on the one hand  
migrant communities preserve values and attitudes 
from the context of origin, while on the other hand 
the socialisation in the societal and cultural context 
of the place of settlement influences how these are 
acted out. The encounter of the two groups in the  
example described reflects these different experiences 
of socialisation. As a result, the refugees feel vindicated 
in their generalising perception of people with a 
Turkey-related migration background by their obser-
vations, while interviewees with a Turkey-related  
migration background reject these statements and 
emphasise the independent development of migrant 
communities in Germany (I5, I6, I11, I13). However, all 
interviewees, including those without experiences of 
forced migration, generally endorsed the interpretation 
of the Turkish refugee cited above. They said that the 
political exclusion and socio-economic disadvantage 
experienced by the ‘guest worker generation’ in 
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constant “deficit orientation of the Turkish upper 
class towards the German Turks”, whom they did not 
regard as “real Turks”, but as descendants of a less  
educated social strata (I11). In this context, two inter-
viewees mentioned the contrast between so-called 
white Turks—members of the old, Kemalist upper 
class—and black Turks, which refers to the inhabit-
ants of the more conservative, rural regions (I11, I12). 
The white Turks do not acknowledge the educational 
advancement and economic success of many mem-
bers of the second and third generation of people in 
Germany with a Turkish migration background. One 
refugee unintentionally confirmed this point of view 
when he said that jokes about the descendants of 
guest workers and their pronunciation of the Turkish 
language were common in Turkey (I1).
Another refugee supported this interpretation  
by using the social difference between the two 
groups to explain the distanced stance of refugee 
shelter employees with a Turkey-related migration 
background (GI3). In his opinion, the problem is that 
the Turkish refugees do not conform to the typical 
image of a “refugee”: “We had a high social status in 
Turkey and also behave accordingly in the accommo-
dation facilities. We abide by the rules and always  
remain considerate”. (GI2). In his opinion, they also 
connect quickly with relatives or existing networks 
in Germany, which also distinguishes them from the 
other inhabitants of the accommodation facilities.  
As an example, he cited the fact that an acquaintance 
had picked him up for the interview with a car, adding 
that the staff viewed this with scepticism, as refugees, 
in their eyes, have a lower status. 
Although this does not apply to many Turkish  
refugees, the cited statements nevertheless reveal 
something about the self-perception of the person 
cited, who believes that his high social status sets 
him apart from the other inhabitants of the shelter 
as well as from the employees. Yet, they also show 
how the loss of status as a result of having to flee  
described in the first part of the analysis section  
affects his interaction with people with a Turkey- 
related migration background in Germany: The inter-
viewee assumes that the staff of the shelter in which 
specifically mobilising these to promote their own 
interest. These lines of conflict were also represented 
within the Turkish diaspora (I1, I11, I12). This is rein-
forced by the activities of the Turkish state in Germany 
and especially its attempts to bind young people to 
Turkey (I11, I12). With these interpretations, the 
interview partners almost literally support the  
assumptions of the theory of conflict transportation. 
At the same time, their critical stance shows that 
core conflicts lead to very diverse and contentious  
responses within migrant communities. With these 
considerations in mind, the reproduction of a conflict 
in the diaspora is only one possible consequence—in 
the interviews with representatives of migrant 
self-organisations, there are also examples of com-
munication projects and critical work with the media. 
However, the interviews also contain indications 
that the social background of the Turkish refugees  
interviewed plays a role in the mutual perception of 
the two groups. Most of the refugees belong to middle- 
class families. Many of them are close to the Gulen 
movement, others have a more secular view of the 
world. All of them have a high level of education and 
mostly come from a metropolitan environment.  
Several interviewees associated with Turkey-related 
migrant self-organisations said that this personal 
background influences the abovementioned opinions 
of refugees with regard to people with a Turkey-related 
migration background who live in Germany. For  
example, one interviewee, who is a member of a  
migrant self-organisation that supports refugees in 
their integration in Germany, remarked that some of 
the Turkish refugees were “on a very high horse” and 
were used to having “all of their wishes fulfilled” in 
Turkey. He said that there were huge differences in 
social behaviour between them and the descendants 
of the guest worker generation in Germany, and that 
the social interaction with the refugees was, there-
fore, difficult (I6). Another interviewee said that it 
was a new experience for the refugees not to receive 
special treatment from German bureaucracy. In Turkey, 
this had long been common practice towards members 
of the upper class (I12). A representative of a social 
agency in the area of migration work spoke of a 
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seekers, the supporters of the Turkish government 
and the Gulen movement have a highly differentiated 
network of organisations, services and relationships 
in NRW, which puts them in a comparatively com-
fortable position. They also have the language skills 
and the specific knowledge to cope with their every-
day life in Germany, which the refugees initially lack. 
But at the same time, they continue to experience 
discrimination and disadvantages by the majority  
society, which, according to some statements, has  
increased in the course of the conflicts since 2016 
(more on this in the following chapter). Thus, it is 
indeed not merely an “importation” of conflict, but a 
process of conflict autonomisation in the German 
context (Feron, 2017). In comparison to the context of 
origin, the socio-economic status of the conflict par-
ties changed substantially, and the Turkish state no 
longer acts directly as a conflict party. The phenome-
non is, therefore, far more complex than mere con-
flict reproduction. 
A further difference is that the fundamental dem-
ocratic order in Germany makes the co-existence of 
all of the groups named possible, even if this does not 
always happen peacefully. Accordingly, some of the 
interviewees find opportunities for political and oc-
cupational activities in Germany to which they cur-
rently have no access in Turkey. For example, some 
scientists and students interviewed in the context of 
this study were able to receive scholarships or re-
search positions at research institutions and univer-
sities in Germany. Supporters of the Gulen movement 
who had fled also receive (social) support from the 
movement in NRW. Some interviewees claimed that 
this was the main reason why they fled to NRW (I11, 
I12). The interviews also show that the interaction 
does not go in one direction only: Turkish refugees, 
as well as migrant self-organisations from the Turkey- 
related communities, try to influence events in Turkey 
from Germany. For example, they support political 
prisoners, provide legal assistance or create platforms 
for critical media coverage (I5, I10, I11). This shows 
how strongly people, some of whom have not lived in 
Turkey for a long time or have never lived there, are 
he lives have a certain image of refugees in need; not 
matching this image is of great importance to him. 
Being a “refugee” is not compatible with his self-im-
age, especially against the background of his former 
social status. Accordingly, most Turkish refugees re-
fused to be categorised as refugees or asylum seekers. 
Instead, they constantly emphasised their previous 
activities and educational background in the inter-
view. In general, many refugees often reject categori-
sations as being stigmatising, and it is particularly 
difficult for people with a high level of education to 
come to terms with the changed situation (Christ, 
2019). A representative of a migrant self-organisations 
calls the Turkish refugees “expatriates”, not refugees 
(I10). However, rejecting this categorisation seems to 
be easier for people close to the Gulen movement 
than for others. Several interviewees confirmed that 
they quickly connected to the social and professional 
networks of the movement in NRW and were able to 
leave the precarious living situation in the accommo-
dation facilities behind them more quickly, and build 
a new life for themselves. The others tended to “fall 
by the wayside”. (I13, I14). 
These statements also confirm one of the basic 
assumptions of the conflict transportation hypothesis: 
Although the lines of conflict within a migrant com-
munity at first glance reflect those of the context of 
origin, they are subject to the structuring influence 
of the settlement society. In the example described 
here, there are similar lines of conflict to those in 
Turkey, such as the one between Gulen supporters 
and supporters of the government, as well as the  
social contrast between members of different social 
strata. However, the case study shows a reversal of 
the established power relations in Turkey, at least  
before the coup attempt. People with a Turkey-related 
migration background living in Germany, whom 
many refugees tend to regard with disdain, have an 
advantage over those refugees who have recently  
arrived and were a privileged part of the upper class 
in Turkey due to their language skills, their organisa-
tional structure and education. While the latter now 
live in a precarious situation as refugees and asylum 
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Migrant self-organisations that emerged from 
Turkey-related migrant communities often provide 
support and advice by volunteers; in some cases, they 
also offer officially recognised integration and lan-
guage courses. For example, organisations related to 
the Gulen movement in NRW are represented by a 
differentiated network, which includes educational 
institutions, schools and cultural associations. There 
are also religiously and politically unaffiliated organ-
isations that have members with a Turkey-related 
migration background or were founded by them. Both 
are points of contact for many refugees. Refugees 
from Turkey, however, usually only contact these  
organisations after personal recommendation due to 
their mistrust described above. Often, either relatives, 
friends or other refugees living in Germany act as  
intermediaries. Representatives of the organisations 
contacted for this study accordingly reported a pro-
nounced scepticism of the refugees, which they only 
overcome when it is clear that the help and support 
offered is sincere and without ulterior motives, and 
that they do not have to fear any negative conse-
quences (I5, I6). Some interview partners explicitly 
advised the refugees not to move exclusively within 
Turkish-speaking communities. A representative of 
an organisation close to the Gulen movement said in 
this context that the worry of many Turkish refugees 
that they would remain socially isolated in Germany 
was technically unfounded, as the proportion of mi-
grants in their neighbourhoods was very high and 
there were many opportunities to connect with a 
community. But he advised them to venture out of 
the Turkish community and connect with the German 
majority society, for example by becoming members 
of sports clubs or joining activities in the neighbour-
hood. Otherwise, they would “experience the trauma 
of having to flee again and again” (I5) within the 
community, as those affected would have to always 
justify their activities in Turkey and their decision to 
flee.
involved in the development of the country, which 
illustrates the transnational character of the process-
es examined.
The statements cited in this chapter show that 
people with a Turkey-related migration background 
who are critical of the government and Turkish refu-
gees in Germany believe that the reasons for the  
existing conflicts are not only to be found in the  
influence exerted by Turkey, but also in the context  
of German society. They reject the perception that 
conflicts are exclusively imported. Although this 
qualitative study cannot validate the connection  
between socio-economic exclusion, influence from 
the context of origin, and the transfer of conflicts 
from one place to the other, its results do support the 
conflict transportation hypothesis. While the quoted 
statements also illustrate the critical spectrum of 
opinions beyond the pro-government positions  
represented by actors from Turkey-related migrant 
communities regarding the events in the context of 
origin as well as the settlement context, the inter-
viewees believe that the German public takes no note 
of these opinions. A homogenising perception that 
labels all people with a Turkey-related migration 
background in Germany as supporters of the Turkish 
government, thus making them responsible for  
conflicts, should, therefore, be rejected. Theoretical 
concepts also warn of this.
“Traitors” and “putschists”? The difficult 
position of migrant self-organisations
To understand the effects of developments in  
Turkey on the communities of people with a Turkey- 
related migration background in NRW, the author  
interviewed representatives of migrant self-organisa-
tions, information centres and research institutions 
that deal with the issue on a scientific or practical 
level. This is also relevant as a test of the conflict 
transportation hypothesis, according to which the 
activities of such organisations can reproduce lines 
of conflict in the settlement society.
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Talks with representatives of all the migrant 
self-organisations visited revealed that the failed  
military coup in Turkey in the summer of 2016 has 
had a major impact on both their work and on Turkey- 
related migrant communities in NRW in general. It 
is true that the lines of conflict that opened up during 
this event have existed for quite some time, but they 
have become even more polarised as a result of the 
developments in recent years. As a result, political 
differences between individuals and families have 
become entrenched. This is particularly evident in 
the religious and family life in the community: Many 
interviewees said that gatherings at weddings, reli-
gious festivals, and public events, for example at panel 
discussions or in the context of local politics, but also 
when visiting mosques, often lead to open conflicts 
(I3, I5, I10, I11). There were also open disputes in 
schools, especially between pupils with Turkish and 
Kurdish migration backgrounds, but also between 
children from families who support the government 
and those who support the Gulen movement. Those 
involved used symbols and manners of speaking from 
the Turkish context: One school social worker, for 
example, said that symbols of the PKK and Turkish 
nationalists were regularly found painted in the 
schoolyard. The word “traitor” (Turkish: hain) was  
often used. Children of Turkish refugees suffered 
from this, as well (I13). Several interviewees reported 
that violent clashes between Gulen supporters and 
supporters of the Turkish government had also oc-
curred outside the schools and that Gulen supporters 
had been forcibly expelled from DITIB mosques (I6, 
I10). These conflicts strongly influence the activities 
of the Gulen movement in Germany. For example,  
following the military coup, many families withdrew 
their children from Gulen-affiliated schools and edu-
cational institutions in NRW (I5, I6, I10). Even ideo-
logically neutral migrant self-organisations with a 
focus on educational work were affected by this, as 
they also soon came under the suspicion of supporting 
Gulen (I11). The insults that supporters of the Gulen 
movement hear in NRW are the same as those reported 
by the refugees: “traitors”, “putschists” or “terrorist 
supporters” (I10, I11, I12, I13).
However, some of the interview partners critical 
of the Gulen movement and the Turkish government 
emphasised that criticism of the Gulen movement 
was definitely dividing all political camps in Turkey. 
They said that for a long time, the movement had 
profited from its proximity to the AKP government 
and that it was accordingly complicit in the dis-
mantling of democracy in Turkey. Accordingly, 
these interviewees were critical of the activities of 
the Gulen-related organisations in Germany, refer-
ring to the conservative understanding of Islam, 
which, in their opinion, the movement was spread-
ing, and to its opaque structures and the unclear 
motivation of its members. They also criticised the 
lack of self-reflection of the Gulen supporters on 
their own role in the conflicts in both Turkey and 
the diaspora (I11, I12, I13). On the one hand, this 
shows how fragmented the debates are within the 
Turkey-related migrant communities. On the other 
hand, these statements again illustrate the trans-
national character of the described conflicts. Sup-
porters and critics of the Gulen movement alike see 
the conflict from the perspective of the conditions 
in Turkey and the German context and refer to this 
transnational context in their statements about the 
respective other groups.
The military coup of 2016 was cited almost una-
nimously by all interviewees as the event that exa-
cerbated these polarisations and, in part, turned 
them into open conflicts. These interviewees said 
that the attitudes of the individual groups had har-
dened so much that it was nigh on impossible to 
break them up. The biggest challenge would be to 
establish a dialogue between the individual camps 
in the first place, as the encounters in public spaces 
usually escalated quickly (I5, I10, I11). A meeting of 
the individual groups would only be possible, if at 
all, on issues that affected all members of the group 
equally, such as discrimination and racism or socio- 
economic exclusion in the context of society as a 
whole (I11). This, too, indicates that these conflicts 
take place in the context of a migration society in 
which socio-economic exclusion influences the 
co-existence of migrant communities.
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that society as a whole had an egalitarian view of 
migrant and diaspora communities and did not 
appreciate the actual diversity and heterogeneity, nor 
the contentious discussions within communities of 
Turkey-related people, reducing them to the conflicts 
in their country of origin instead (I5, I6, I10, I11).
In this context, one interview partner called on 
society as a whole “not to give up on” the government- 
supporting portion of the Turkey-related communities 
in Germany and “not to leave them to their own de-
vices” (I5); “Generations are lost [as a result]”, people 
were becoming susceptible to nationalist slogans and 
were turning away from German society (I6). For this 
reason, he advised the members of his organisation 
and the refugees supported by it to position them-
selves towards society as a whole regarding develop-
ments in Turkey and to make themselves visible. He 
feared that otherwise, a homogenising, anti-Turkish 
public perception would gain the upper hand, which 
would ultimately affect all people with a Turkey- 
related migration background (I6). Similar statements 
were made by several interview partners (I5, I10, I11, I12). 
Some interviewees were frustrated by the fact 
that the German majority society often reduced the 
identities of people with a Turkey-related migration 
background to the activities of government-loyal  
individuals and organisations in Germany, while it 
did not acknowledge the contentious disputes taking 
place between people with a Turkish background. As 
a result, they felt compelled to position and justify 
themselves publicly with regard to the developments 
in Turkey and within the Turkey-related migrant 
communities (I6, I11). For example, one female inter-
viewee who is actively involved in an organisation 
that supports refugees and in an educational associa-
tion noted that she was annoyed by the fact that she 
was constantly being asked where she came from 
and what her political views were; but she was now 
just as annoyed if she was not asked about it. The  
polarising debates of recent times had caused her to 
reassess her own affiliation, with an outcome that 
was yet not clear (I6). 
The representation of their convictions in society 
is therefore important for most of the interviewed  
refugees and people with a Turkey-related migration 
background. This applies to representation within 
the migrant communities as well as with regard to 
the German state and society as a whole. The repre-
sentatives of migrant self-organisations who were  
interviewed complained that the Turkish state was 
trying to become the mouthpiece of the Turkey-related 
communities and to assert an exclusive right of 
representation towards German politics. This would 
not represent the actual diversity of migrant realities 
and opinions in Germany and would confirm preju-
dices against the communities.
At the same time, intense pressure to conform 
was being built up (I5, I6, I10, I11). This statement  
reflects the assumption of the conflict transportation 
hypothesis that the experience of exclusion from the 
settlement society can lead to a re-evaluation of one‘s 
own identity—however, as the examples mentioned 
show, not necessarily through a homogenising return 
to a supposed “original identity”, but with open out-
comes. Accordingly, the interview partners lamented 
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interpret these conflicts more as a result of the polar-
ising developments within the Turkey-related mi-
grant communities, which in their view are also a  
result of socio-economic exclusion in the context of 
the majority society and the influence of the Turkish 
government.
At the same time, both groups perceive clear dif-
ferences between each other concerning socialisation 
and behaviour. Ultimately, their encounters in the  
urban micro-context in NRW are determined by the 
socio-economic conditions found in the respective 
social and geographical context and the political atti-
tudes which have developed there. This analysis con-
firms the assumptions of the conflict transportation 
hypothesis, which, besides the exertion of influence 
from the context of origin, consider the exclusion ex-
perienced in the place of settlement to be a reason for 
the openness of some parts of migrant communities 
towards nationalist attitudes and for the emergence 
of conflicts. This shows that the conflict transportation 
assumed by the theory exists in parts of the Turkey- 
related migrant communities in NRW. At least the  
interview partners mentioned all factors identified by 
the theory that favour such a transportation: A strong 
group identity and segregation in parts of the com-
munities, socio-economic exclusion and discrimina-
tion by the majority society, the influence of nation-
alist actors and the polarising effect of conflict events 
in Turkey. 
These findings are also manifestations of the 
transnational living environments of the interview 
partners and show their transnational frame of refer-
ence. They process influences from both the German 
settlement society and the Turkish society of origin. 
The result is a complex conflict relationship that  
relates, on the one hand, to the consequences of a 
forced migration process and the repression in Turkey, 
and, on the other, also relates to reputation and status 
within German society, in the Turkey-related migrant 
communities, as well as discrimination suffered in 
each case.  
This study shows how Turkish refugees and people 
with a Turkey-related migration background interact 
with each other in everyday life in NRW and how 
they perceive each other. In this process, disputes 
have occured between the two groups that refer to 
discourses and discursive frameworks from the Turkish 
political context. The insults “traitor”, “terrorist” or 
“Gulenist” are indicative of this, as they refer to the 
political circumstances in Turkey and reflect the 
style of the pro-government Turkish media. This 
shows that the political developments in Turkey have 
also caused a strong polarisation within the Turkey- 
related migrant communities in Germany, which in 
turn has an impact on the refugees. 
According to the statements of the participants 
in the study, there were no violent incidents between 
refugees and people with a Turkey-related migration 
background. The evasive behaviour and the utmost 
caution of the refugees probably played a role in 
avoiding violence, too. However, violence occurred 
within the Turkey-related migrant communities in 
the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, espe-
cially between supporters of the Turkish government 
and the Gulen movement. People with a Kurdish 
background also seem to have been more frequently 
involved in acts of violence, but this was not the focus 
of the study and needs to be analysed in a separate 
study. The effect of the clashes mentioned in this 
study is above all an increased mistrust and a high 
level of caution in the everyday lives of the participants 
of the study. These latent conflicts are a heavy emo-
tional burden for those affected and strongly influ-
ence their behaviour. Even though violent clashes are 
rare, the risk of escalation cannot be ruled out.
The refugees experience these conflicts as a con-
tinuation of the persecution suffered in Turkey and 
the loss of status during their flight. They, therefore, 
resort to tactics to protect themselves that they already 
had to acquire in Turkey. This often reinforces their 
already existing bias against Germans with a Turkey- 
related migration background. However, the latter 
Conclusion
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with people who have only recently fled to Germany. 
Future studies on conflict transportation should, 
therefore, take a closer look at the everyday experi-
ences of refugees instead of focusing on particularly 
conflict-laden events, such as religious festivals or 
political events of diaspora groups. A comprehensive 
empirical study of conflicts within migrant commu-
nities is required, in which conversations with repre-
sentatives of organisations and individuals of all  
political orientations must be conducted. Further in-
sights can be provided by approaches such as figura-
tive analysis, which looks at everyday interactions in 
urban spaces and understands them to be indicators 
of social processes (Hüttermann, 2018), or the security-
scapes perspective, which consciously analyses every-
day experiences of uncertainty and the reactions of 
those affected (von Boemcken, Boboyorov & Bagdasa-
rova, 2018). 
From this study, two conclusions can be drawn: 
First, in this case, the experiences of refugees and 
people with a migration history in Germany can 
hardly be separated, even if they differ significantly. 
Members of both groups meet in everyday life, whereby 
the political developments in the context of origin 
are very present in the form of certain discourses and 
manners of speaking. At the same time, migrant 
self-organisations do important local integration 
work for refugees and offer them points of contact. 
They also attempt to mediate between the state, soci-
ety as a whole, migrant communities, and refugees, 
while concurrently having to moderate complex 
identity-building processes among their members. 
This leads to the second conclusion: Such con-
flicts are not a purely imported phenomenon. Instead, 
these conflicts are part of a migration society that is 
constantly changing. People with a migration history 
grapple with influences from different geographical 
contexts. Due to their often intense personal and 
emotional involvement in the development of their 
country of origin, conflict events there also influence 
their everyday lives in Germany. Therefore, demanding 
Due to the qualitative nature of the study, the  
results of the research presented here are not repre-
sentative of the entirety of people and organisations 
with a Turkey-related migration background in NRW. 
However, they shed light on the diverse and contro-
versial discourses within these communities and on 
the critical attitudes of many of their members and 
organisations towards the political situation in Turkey 
as well as developments within the Turkey-related 
migrant communities and towards society as a whole. 
This clearly contradicts the majority society’s homog-
enising perception of people with a Turkey-related 
migration background—an attitude that many inter-
view partners complained about. A differentiated 
view that takes the statements and views of those  
affected seriously is imperative. 
This study also reveals some gaps in research to 
which theory has not yet found an answer. In the ex-
isting research on the subject, refugees are practically 
non-existent, and it refers almost exclusively to dias-
pora and migrant communities that have long lived 
outside their context of origin. The results of the 
study justify doubts as to whether the experience of 
one group can be transferred to the other. Re-ethnici-
sation, which is assumed for situations of violent mi-
gration and socio-economic marginalisation, is a  
precondition for a conflict transportation in the 
sense of the theoretical assumption. This, however, is 
lacking in the case of the refugees While this might 
be a specific feature of this well-educated and eco-
nomically comparatively privileged group of refu-
gees., it nevertheless means that experiences of 
forced displacement do not necessarily lead to a  
resurgence of potentially conflict-laden, essentialist 
identities. Instead, refugees need emotional and  
social support to overcome their insecurity and suc-
cessfully manage a new start in the settlement con-
text. When it comes to avoiding developments such 
as those described in the study, the experiences of 
refugees and Turkey-related migrant communities, 
therefore, provide important insights for dealing 
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that those affected disassociate themselves from the 
context of origin entirely does not do justice to their 
transnational realities, assumes they do not feel that 
they belong to Germany, and does not take their 
self-perception seriously. 
But this raises the question of how to handle 
such conflicts in practice. First of all, it is important 
to understand their complexity, which is what this 
study wants to encourage. To do justice to this com-
plexity, successful conflict management must be 
based on a differentiated, empirically founded analysis. 
Migrant communities and migrant self-organisa-
tions are not homogeneous blocs and should by no 
means be reduced to conflicts. Besides organisations 
that are influenced by actors from the context of ori-
gin, there are also those that are critical of both the 
society of origin and the settlement society. However, 
the views of these organisations and their members 
often receive little attention in public discourse, and 
many of them are struggling with structural issues 
such as insecure funding or high workloads. They, in 
particular, also suffer from conflicts and the conse-
quences of polarised discourse. Political measures to 
prevent conflicts should, therefore, first appreciate 
and support the work of these organisations, as they 
are the source of important initiatives for mutual  
understanding. Better financial and structural support 
would, therefore, be a good first step
The research literature on the subject shows  
that migrant self-organisations can use the political 
opportunities available in the settlement context to 
build up civic structures and democratic institutions, 
thus integrating migrant communities into the poli-
tical processes of society as a whole. If, in this way, 
they transform conflicts into democratic discussions, 
this is to be welcomed.
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